"Carthage Must Be Destroyed!" Cried a Roman Statesman. So That's Just What Rome Did. (2024)

The great captains of antiquity were not often given to bouts of melancholic introspection. They were a hardened lot, largely inured to the carnage and suffering they caused.

Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, commander of the Roman legions that besieged Carthage in the mid–second centuryBC, was not a typical great captain of the ancient world. A Roman aristocrat, hewas the son of Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, victor of the 168BCBattle of Pydna, and the adoptivegrandson of Scipio Africanus, who had vanquished Hannibal at Zama in 202BC. Scipio Aemilianus was also the patron of the eponymous Scipionic Circle, a gathering of literary and philosophical luminaries that included the Greek historian Polybius, the Roman African playwright Terence and the Stoicphilosopher Panaetius. Scipio and friends were foremost among Romans who embraced Greek culture and refinement.

In the spring of 146BConce mighty Carthage fell to Scipio’s troops. Observing the city in its death throes, he beganto weep and quoted aloud a line from theIliad: “The day shall come in which our sacred Troy, and Priam, and the people over whom spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all.” Polybius was at Scipio’s side when he spoke Homer’swords and asked what the consul meant by them. Scipio, believing Carthage’s doom was the ultimate fate of all great nations and empires, expressed his fear Rome would one day suffer a similar fate.

Rome and Carthagehad previously fought two long wars.While the First Punic War (264–241BC) centered on Sicily,the Second Punic War (218–201BC) engulfed Iberia, NorthAfrica, Sicily, Sardinia and mainland Italy. (The Latin wordpunicusderives from the Greek termPhoinix, a reference tothe Carthaginians’ Phoenician origins.) Each conflict hadbeen enormously costly to the warring empires. Rome had outlasted Carthage both times, despite havingbeen brought to the verge of ruin by Hannibal in the Second Punic War. The latterended with Carthage agreeing by treatyin 201BCto relinquish its overseasterritories and pay Rome a massiveindemnity over the next half century.

Contrary to expectation, Carthageprospered greatly in the wake of itssecond defeat, its people focusing ontrade and the agricultural developmentof their remaining North African holdings.The result was a robust economy that enabledCarthage to shoulder the heavy burden ofthe annual indemnity payments to Rome.

One Roman in particular, the octogenarian consul and statesman MarcusPorcius Cato, was dismayed by Carthage’s resurgence. On paying a visitto the flourishing city in 157BCand recalling the prior Punic wars, Catoperceived a mortal threat to Rome inthe making. Back home he ended all ofhis public speeches with the same refrain:“I am also of the opinion that Carthage shouldcease to exist.” The phrase is remembered today in its pithierform: “Carthage must be destroyed.” During at least onespeaking occasion Cato held aloft a ripe, three-day-old NorthAfrican fig to illustrate just how dangerously close Carthagelay to Italy. He argued for a pre-emptive war to eliminatetheir long-standing nemesis before it did the same to Rome.

Cato and his fellow war hawks only needed a propercasus belliagainst Carthage to have their way. They got itwhen the aged Massinissa, king of Numidia and an allyof Rome since the closing days of the Second Punic War,became embroiled in a territorial spat with Carthage overthe North African region of Emporia (present-day westernLibya). Under the terms of the 201BCtreaty Rome wascompelled to adjudicate the dispute. Not surprising, theSenate came down heavily, even outrageously, in favor ofMassinissa’s rather dubious claim to Emporia. Addinginsult to injury, it also imposed an indemnity of 500 talents(a talent was roughly 70 pounds of silver) on Carthage forhaving enjoyed the fruits of the region.

Thus emboldened, the Numidian king continued toencroach on Carthaginian territory, eventually claimingjust about all of it, with the exception of the city of Carthage itself. Realizing Rome would never rein in Massinissa, Carthage went on the offensive against Numidian raiders atOroscopa (in present-day northwestern Tunisia) in 151BC.Its 30,000-man army, under the command of Hasdrubal theBoetharch, aggressively pursued the Numidians, only to beencircled in a hilltop camp and starved into submission. Notwithstanding its abject failure, the campaign represented a blatant breach of the peace of 201BC, which forbade Carthage from waging war without first seeking Roman approval. That was all the excuse Rome’s pro-war party needed.

Hoping to placate the Romans, the Carthaginians condemned Hasdrubal and sent an embassy to Rome but were coldly rebuffed. The Senate then approved a formal declaration of war against Carthage and dispatched an expeditionary force of 80,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 150 war galleys to Africa under the two consuls for 149BC, ManiusManilius and Lucius Marcius Censorinus. The North African port city of Utica, within 30 miles’ march of Carthage,went over to the Romans and became a base for their army.

Wholly unprepared to contend with such an immenseinvasion force, Carthage rushed another embassy to Rome.The envoys were instructed to deliver 300 children fromaristocratic Carthaginian families as hostages to the consuls,then en route to Africa, and to obey the latter’s commandsin all other respects. If they did these things, the Senate declared, then Rome would respect Carthaginian sovereignty,freedom, property and laws. Out of options, Carthageagreed and surrendered the nobles’ children to the consuls.

The consuls next ordered the Carthaginians to disarm,which they promptly did. But Rome’s bad faith became manifest when the consuls ultimately proclaimed theirstanding orders: Carthage was to be razed and its populacedisplaced at least 10 miles inland. The Carthaginians wouldnever again be a maritime people.

Facing the wholesale destruction of their capital cityand way of life, the Carthaginians finally resolved to fight.They produced weapons at a breakneck pace to replace those they had handed over. Military operations in thehinterlands were entrusted to Hasdrubal, who remainedat the head of some 30,000 soldiers.

The consuls wouldhave to secure victory the hard way.Laying siege to a sprawling city of as many as 800,000 inhabitants was a daunting prospect. Not only did Carthageboast a 20-plus-mile perimeter of stout, tower-studded wallssome 40 feet high and 30 feet thick, but also its topographyrendered it a formidable challenge. The city lay on a peninsula connected to the mainland by a 3-mile-wide isthmus,a difficult expanse for any besieger to effectively guard. ThusHasdrubal, having access to cities deeper in Carthaginianterritory, was able to run supplies straight into Carthage,right past the Romans’ porous blockade.

Neither Manilius nor Censorinus made much initialheadway, as Hasdrubal’s men continually harried bothconsuls’ rear-area operations. Censorinus brought up giantbattering rams and opened a breach in the walls, but counterattacking Carthaginians readily repulsed the legionaries.Only the levelheadedness of a single tribune, Scipio Aemilianus, prevented a catastrophe. As the main body oflegionaries surged inside the walls, Scipio wisely held backhis men in the event the attack failed. When it did, Scipio’stroops plunged in to fend off the enemy and spare the retreating Romans from total destruction.

From within the city the enterprising Carthaginians successfully sortied with fireships to burn much of the Romanfleet at anchor. A follow-up attack one night very nearlyoverran Manilius’ camp. On that occasion Scipio intervenedto strike at the rear of the Carthaginian force, promptingit into a hasty retreat. During a subsequent abortive attackby Manilius against the nearby city of Nepheris, four Romancohorts found themselves trapped atop a hill ringed byenemy troops. Again riding to the rescue, Scipio led a small force of cavalry to driveoff the Carthaginians and escort the legionaries to camp.

The aged Massinissa, though his greed had been an underlying cause of this war,was conspicuous by his absence. Displeasedthe Romans had not conferred with him inadvance about the campaign, he refrainedfrom taking part. After the grasping kingdied in 148BC, at around age 90, Scipio received welcome help from his son, Gulussa,whose incomparable light cavalry helpedsuppress mounted Carthaginian marauders harrying the Romans in the hinterlands.

By then Manilius and Censorinus werereaching the end of their annual terms, andincoming consul Lucius Calpurnius Piso andhis fleet admiral, Lucius Hostilius Mancinus, were en route to Africa. Scipio dutifullysailed back to Rome, where he planned tostand for election as aedile, a mid-level post in the Roman government.

Over the course of the coming year reports from the Carthaginian front were nobetter than they had been under Censorinusand Manilius. Piso was thrown back when he attacked thecity of Aspis, and for the entire summer he lay stymiedbefore the city walls of coastal Hippo Acra. Forced to abandon the siege, the humiliated consul led his men on theignominious march into winter quarters in Utica.

Meanwhile, Hasdrubal remained at large with his army.At that juncture Carthage’s prospects didn’t look so bleak.It had proven Rome anything but invincible. Yet infightinghad taken a toll. Hasdrubal the Boetharch, scheming formore power, brought an accusation before Carthage’s popular assembly, alleging that the city’s commander, alsonamed Hasdrubal and a nephew of the Numidian Gulussa,was plotting to betray Carthage. Swallowing the rumor,the assemblymen beat Hasdrubal to death with the verybenches on which they sat. They replaced him with hisaccuser, Hasdrubal the Boetharch.

Meanwhile, Rome was keento find a new commanderto take the reins of its floundering army in North Africa. Scipio, the only success story of the war, proved a natural choice. Though he was a candidate for an aedileship and,according to Roman law, was too young (at age 37) to standas consul, the Senate voted him to the consulship regardless. In an additional gesture of confidence the Romanpeople voted directly to place Scipio in charge of the latestPunic war, instead of allowing his post to be determinedby lot, as was customary.

After collecting fresh troops, Scipio sailed for Africa.In his absence Mancinus had mounted an amphibiousattack on Carthage itself. After seizing a sally port, however,the operation had floundered, leaving the consul, his 3,500men and their ships stranded inside, unable to advance orretreat, as night came on.

Mancinus sent an urgent plea for reinforcements toUtica, where he expected Piso to be, but the latter was offbesieging other towns in Carthaginian territory. As fortunewould have it, arriving that very night in Utica was Scipio,Piso’s replacement as consul. Scipio simply sailed on toCarthage, boarded Mancinus’ stranded men on his ownships and spirited them to safety.

After formally assuming command, Scipio assessed hisarmy. What he found was not to his liking. Two years ofabject failure had led to a serious decline in morale and discipline. Some legionaries were conducting unauthorizedlooting expeditions into the countryside. Others had deserted to the Carthaginians, a truly reprehensible step forany Roman soldier. Furthermore, lax security had alloweda force of Carthaginians to set up camp scarcely a half milefrom the city. They were soon joined by Hasdrubal, whobrought with him 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry.

Scipio moved quickly to restore order and discipline, firstcasting out the camp followers and other assorted hangers-on. Having secured a firm grip on his army, Scipio made his first move as commander, leading an assault force equippedwith axes, ladders and pry bars against Megara, a suburbabutting the city walls of Carthage. Its defenders ultimatelyspotted the Roman force and repelled the main attack, buta handful of legionaries managed to capture a deserted toweralmost adjoining the city walls. From this redoubt they ranplanks across the gap, dropped into Carthage and broke opena gate. Scipio rushed inside at the head of 4,000 legionaries.

Its defenders, thinking the city lost, retreated within Byrsa,Carthage’s fortified central citadel. Megara, however, proveda bewildering maze of streets and water-filled ditches. Scipio,concerned his men might fall into an ambush in the darkness, again showed his coolness under pressure by withdrawinghis troops.

Hasdrubal the Boetharch, who had taken over Carthage’s defense after his successful takedown of the previousHasdrubal, vented his rage at the Roman attack on Megara by having Roman prisoners tortured within view of Scipio’sbesieging forces and then tossed from the city walls. Thoughintended to stiffen Carthaginian resolve, his cruelty insteaddrew the ire of internal critics. Hasdrubal had several such“domestic enemies” summarily executed. As the siegedragged on, he increasingly became a tyrannical commander,seeking to cow his terrified men into compliance.

this article first appeared in Military History magazine

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Scipio understoodthe only way to capture Carthagewould be to sever its links to the outside world, for whilethose remained, its defenders could still bring in food and other supplies to sustain its huge population. Accordingly,he had his men torch the Carthaginian encampment outsidethe city walls, which Hasdrubal had abandoned amid the attack on Megara. Scipio then built an enormous fortifiedcamp, with trenches and palisades extending from one sideof the isthmus to the other, thus cutting off the capital’s landward communication with the restof Africa. As food supplies dwindled,Hasdrubal gave what little remained tohis soldiers, leaving citizens to starve.

Scipio next constructed a breakwater, extending across the harbormouth from a finger of land called theTaenia, to sever Carthage’s seawardcommunications. Recognizing theexistential threat the barrier posed,the Carthaginians constructed wargalleys in secret from whatever scrapwood they could find. Then one day atdawn they emerged suddenly from anewly built entrance beyond the reachof the breakwater, taking the Romanscompletely by surprise. But the Carthaginians squandered their opportunity, merely rowing about in a showof force before retiring within theconfines of the harbor. When theyemerged again three days later, this time for battle, theRoman fleet was ready for them and mauled the Carthaginian ships, which stacked up along a merchant quay as theysought to retreat back inside the harbor.

Scipio promptly assaulted the quay and brought up siegeengines, but Carthaginian swimmers managed to stage asurprise nighttime raid and set fire to the rams and otherengines. Refusing to relent, Scipio ultimately captured thequay, from which his soldiers began to launch burningmissiles into the city.

In the winter of 147BCScipio struck at neighboringNepheris, which fell after a three-week siege. With its capture the last store of food destined for Carthage was inRoman hands, and the famine within its walls deepened.

The end for Carthage came in the spring of 146BC. Afterbreaching a harbor wall, Scipio’s troops assaulted the citadelof Byrsa and its surrounding district. Braving a rain of missiles hurled from the district’s six-story houses, the Romansengaged in house-to-house fighting and a vicious rooftopbrawl for control. Scipio then ordered the district set ablaze.The fire quickly spread, claiming the lives of scores of innocent civilians who had sought refuge in Byrsa. As the housescollapsed in flames, the streets filled with shrieking burnvictims and scorched and crushed corpses and body parts.

What followed over the next six days and nights was purebutchery. Scipio had his units fight in rotation, swapping infresh soldiers for tired ones. On the seventh day of thebattle for Byrsa, Carthaginian civilians sued for safe passage,and Scipio allowed 50,000 of them to depart, though theywere later sold into slavery. Not as fortunate were some900 Roman deserters who had holed up with Hasdrubal inthe lofty Temple of Eshmun, the Phoenician god of healing.Knowing all too well what fate awaited them if captured,the turncoat legionaries fought with the courage of desperation. After a period of bitter resistance, they made their laststand on the temple roof. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal left behindhis wife and two sons with the holdouts at the temple tosurrender himself to Scipio, cravenly hoping to save his ownskin. Scipio had Hasdrubal paraded before the diehards.

Cursing their faithless erstwhile ally, the surviving defenders set fire to the temple and leaped to their deaths inthe blaze. Hasdrubal’s wife, clad in the best clothes left to her and showing far more courage than her husband, let loose a torrent of insults against him. She then slew her sons, tossedtheir bodies into the flames and jumped in after them. Withthat horrific end to all resistance, the sack of the city began.

In the aftermathScipio found himself standing besidePolybius and quoting Homer as they watched Carthage die.The young Roman consul had good cause to ponder thevicissitudes of fortune as his soldiers plundered the fallencity. Though he was certain to receive a triumph for hissuccessful campaign, his mind dwelled on less fortuitousfates. Troy had fallen, as had Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedon and now Carthage. He envisioned a similarly bleak fate for Rome. Half a millennium would pass, but Scipio’s visionultimately came to fruition with the fifth century collapseand fall of the Western Roman empire.

Marc G. DeSantis is the author ofRome Seizes the Trident: The Defeat of Carthaginian Sea Power and the Forging of the Roman Empire(2016) andA Naval History of the Peloponnesian War: Ships, Men & Money inthe War at Sea, 431–404BC(2018). For further reading he recommendsCarthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization, by Richard Miles;The Punic Wars, by Adrian Goldsworthy; andA History of the Romans, by Robert Forman Horton.